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The Internet money gaming industry started booming during the first decade of the 21st century. 
By the end of the decade the competition for new playing customers and their money had become 
overheated. Operators fought for new customers at almost any cost and wherever there is money, 
there are fraudsters, too.  
This thesis describes the money gaming environment from the point of view of a team focusing 
on fraud prevention at money gaming operators. It shares some experiences about designing, 
creating and implementing some basic tools used in screening and monitoring suspicious 
activities in the gaming system. It also takes a closer look at the process of handling suspect, 
fraudulent players and gives suggestions about streamlining, how to make this process more 
effective, efficient, and user-friendly to both the gaming operator employees and the playing 
customers involved. 
This thesis is based on the author's personal experience in working for two different online gaming 
operators in two different countries, in two different decades. 
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- Nettirahapelien petoksentorjuntatiimien tehtäviä ja työkaluja 
2000-luvun ensimmäisellä vuosikymmenellä internetin rahapelejä tarjoavissa palveluissa elettiin 
räjähdysmäisen kasvun aikaa. Vuosikymmenen loppuun mennessä kilpailu uusista asiakkaista ja 
näiden rahoista kävi ylikierroksilla: Pelioperaattorit haalivat uusia asiakkaita melkeinpä hintaan 
mihin hyvänsä. Ja aina kun rahaa on liikkeellä, on huijareitakin. 
Valotan tässä opinnäytetyössä rahapeliteollisuuden toimintakulttuuria pelioperaattoreiden 
petoksentorjuntaan keskittyneiden tiimien näkökulmasta. Jaan kokemuksiani siitä, miten 
suunnittelin, kehitin ja toteutin joitakin perustyökaluja, joita käytimme seuloaksemme ja 
valvoaksemme epäilyttävältä vaikuttavaa pelitoimintaa. Tarkastelen myös sitä, kuinka 
mahdollisesta petoksesta epäiltyjä tapauksia käsitellään, ja kuinka näitä prosesseja voisi 
tehostaa ja ennen kaikkea tehdä käyttäjäystävällisemmäksi sekä asian parissa työskenteleville 
henkilöille että peliasiakkaille. 
Opinnäytetyö perustuu omakohtaisiin kokemuksiin työskentelystä kahdella eri pelioperaattorilla, 
kahdessa eri maassa, kahdella vuosikymmenellä. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The author started working for an internet money gaming service provider in 2007 with 
no prior knowledge about the industry at all. My role at the company service desk (SPOC 
– Single Point of Contact) dealt with daily operations, incident management, bug 
reporting. On occasion, the author was asked to take out most various reports from the 
gaming system database; those occasions soon became a daily routine, and as result 
the author became familiar wit the database quite thoroughly. When the Fraud 
Management Team was founded, the author was up to the challenge and immediately 
applied for a position. 
Fraud Management Team, Security Department, Payments and Fraud, Consumer 
Safety – A beloved child has many names. Most people have never heard of these 
teams, and little do the know they probably have had had to do with one already at one 
point or another. Few people know what a Fraud Management Team does or who they 
deal with, let alone the tools of the trade. Some companies have multinational fraud 
teams with members from a dozen countries or more. It can be discussed whether or not 
a Fraud Management Team is always necessary,  and what the bare minimum is  or if 
we could make away with them altogether.  
This thesis describes the basic internet money gaming environment, some tasks of fraud 
teams, and introduces an approach where a fraud team develops and tests simple tools 
for themselves to assist themselves in the daily routines, tools that can later be used as 
prototypes for more thorough in-house software development.  
. 
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2 EXTERNAL TASKS 
Some of the Fraud Teams' work is due to legislation or contracts with 3rd parties. Usually 
these would fall under the term Compliance. Naturally, it is the job of a compliance 
manager or a compliance team to see to, that all external obligations are fulfilled. The 
practical work then falls to those with best opportunities to serve this purpose. This 
chapter lists some of these tasks and reasons why these tasks often belong to Fraud 
Teams. 
2.1 KYC 
Identity check is known as KYC (Know your customer) in this industry. It is probably the 
most common task performed by fraud management teams in international online money 
gaming companies. Identity needs to be checked for various reasons. The requirements 
may vary depending on the jurisdiction under which the operator operates and the 
customer is located. These two are not necessarily the same. 
Operators need to make sure the customer has the right to play: 
Age: The customer needs to be of gambling age. In most countries this is, they have to 
be 18 years of age or older. Failing to check the age may prove expensive: In Malta, for 
example, the law (MGA. 2018.) stipulates that all money deposited by underage 
customers must be returned to them, irrespective of their wins or losses in gaming 
activities. 
Citizenship, residence, location: The customer must be located in a country that does 
not forbid online gaming with the operator. The U.S.A., for example, forbids all online 
money gaming from its territory (FBI. 2007.) with overseas operators, and the operators 
are very careful to respect this, stopping any gaming activity from U.S. IP-addresses; For 
some reason, smaller countries' similar wishes do not cause same kind of paranoia. 
France and Spain, for example, forbid online gaming with non-licensed operators. In 
Finland, the customer needs to be a resident of Mainland Finland in order to play the 
national monopoly operator Veikkaus' online games. 
National peculiarities: In Estonia, the population registry includes a parameter about the 
citizen's wish to play or not to play online. Licensed gaming operators need to check this 
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upon signup, and act accordingly: Hefty fines are imposed if an operator is caught letting 
such persons play, who have in the population registry marked  that they should not. In 
Denmark, similarly, the citizens can add themselves to a register (ROFUS) if they want 
to be banned from online gaming.  
The residence or location of the playing customer may affect where the operator needs 
to pay the taxes, and how much. The residence or location of the playing customer may 
affect what kinds of gaming products the operator is allowed to offer and, what kind of 
marketing and promotions the operator can offer. Anti money laundering legislation 
requires gaming operators to know their customers. 
2.2. Anti money laundering reporting 
Similar to banks, insurance companies and payment operators, gaming operators, too, 
are obliged to know their customers and to monitor financial transactions and report any 
suspected money laundering or transactions with sums above a certain threshold levels 
to the authorities (Finanssivalvonta. 2010.) A failure in doing so may lead to legal 
prosecution. (Nya Aland. 2017.) The operator needs to appoint a Money Laundering 
Reporting Officer (MLRO) for this task. Very often it comes naturally that this is a person 
from a fraud management team.  
In a perfect world, all gaming company employees dealing with playing customers would 
be aware of the issue of money laundering, and contact the operator MLRO whenever 
they encounter suspicious activity. MLRO would then investigate and make the decision 
about reporting. For gaming companies, however, the reporting obligation might raise a 
conflict of interest: Money launderers are possibly the best customers a gaming company 
can have. Reporting such a customer to the authorities might lead to investigation and a 
loss of a good customer.  However, in 2014 in Finland alone, gaming operators filed 
9100 money laundering reports to the authorities. To give the figure some proportions, 
the banks in Finland filed a total of 1125 reports during the same period. (KRP 2014. 8.) 
Nine thousand, one hundred reports is a huge number – one report may consist of many 
transactions. The money laundering reporting form on National Bureau of Investigation 
NBI (Keskusrikospoliisi, KRP) website does not look very inviting: Filling in different 
fields, many of which have little or no relevance with money gaming industry, about 
figures, transactions or suspicions that the user can hardly know or even speculate can 
feel like being interrogated for a crime one has not committed – as a suspect! Even if all 
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the customer data from the company systems were available in a convenient format, it 
is not possible that all the reports would have been filed this way i.e. manually entering 
the information – not even any significant number of reports. NBI offers a possibility of 
submitting the information in XML-format, however. This leads to the conclusion, that 
one or more gaming operators in Finland are automatically filing money laundering 
reports, with most probably the same standard text and fields for each playing customer 
whose money transaction or sum of transactions exceeds a certain threshold level. Even 
when automatised, 9100 reports is still a huge number, which raises more questions: 
Have the gaming operators intentionally set the reporting threshold lower than required 
by the law? Would this be to make sure they always fulfil the formal requirements, the 
letter of the law with the easiest, simplest technical solution, or is there something more 
into it? Moreover, do the operators any longer really know their customers, as is the spirit 
of the law, if the systems file in a report based on one single variable, the money 
deposited.  
2.3. Authority requests: Police, bailiff, social workers 
Reputation is the most important asset of an Operator.  The customer database is 
another asset. The customer database is confidential: Gaming operators do not reveal 
their customers' identities or activities unless to a competent authority, and only when so 
required by the law: The police may ask about deposits and withdrawals, the bailiff about 
customer account balance, for example. Even some social workers in Finland have been 
seen sending inquiries about their clients' activities, forgetting that they, too, have 
confidentiality obligations and no gaming operator would comment on such requests as 
they are not based on law – well-meant or not.  In order to guarantee confidentiality, the 
task of the answering authority requests needs to be assigned to one team only. 
Confidentiality then means confidentiality both ways: The operator is often by the 
authorities requested not to inform the playing customer of possible police investigations 
or bailiff distraint orders. Often these tasks falls to the fraud management team; they are 
deemed to best know or find out the authenticity of such requests on one hand, and to 
find the requested data on the other.  
Such is the confidentiality of a customer database that one gaming operator in Malta 
requires their new employees to sign an agreement, that the employee has to pay a fine 
of tens of thousands of euros to the operator if he/she reveals customer details to 
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outsiders. The agreement also says that this fine can not be contested at the court of 
law. The reasons for confidentiality are self-evident, but worth mentioning: In different 
countries, areas, cultures and groups the attitudes towards gambling vary: In Finland 
money gaming is probably more acceptable than anywhere else: There are slot 
machines  everywhere, and participating in the weekly national Lotto lottery happens 
even in many workplaces among colleagues. Even in Sweden, the attitude is similar, 
however, the public in general would probably not look well on a politician gambling away 
huge sums of money, anywhere. (Svenska Dagbladet. 2014.) 
A customer database would be very valuable in the hands of another gaming operator. 
Such databases have legally changed hands against huge sums of money when, for 
example, Spain started to grant licenses for gaming operators and subsequently requires 
operators to have them: Only a handful of operators decided to continue activity in the 
country, the rest at least partly selling their customer data to the remaining operators. 
Sometimes someone wins the jackpot – the winners in most cases prefer to stay 
anonymous. 
2.4. Tasks due to contracts with 3rd parties 
A fraud management team may be assigned the task of replying to external payment 
service providers' requests regarding fraud or suspicious activities. It is only logical, that 
a fraud team handles chargeback reports from payment service providers. They will 
always handle the chargeback information, because in this way, the information can be 
used by the team to track the funds, to search for possible related cases, and to learn 
about the behavior of suspect fraudsters. 
 
Full service gaming operators seldom run all the operations themselves. Some, most or 
all the games can be run by external service providers. Poker and sports betting are the 
most common game categories run by external partners. In fraud related cases, the 
operator fraud management team contacts the external service provider fraud teams and 
vice-versa. Most cases involve identification verification and suspicious gaming activities 
in poker tables. Both the operators and the external service providers value quick 
response times in handling possible requests of stopping the funds where they are. 
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3 CUSTOMER ANALYSIS: KYC – KNOW YOUR 
CUSTOMER 
3.1 Identity 
The first chapter described the possible legal requirements of identity check. Identity 
check is not in place only to please the authorities, but it is also a cornerstone of all 
fraud management in its internal core tasks: We need and want to know who is playing. 
Unfortunately we can not ask all of the customers come by, show their ID at the 
headquarters. Identification needs to take place online. Do we then know anymore who 
we are dealing with?  
National monopolies, gaming operators operating in one country only may have it easy: 
In Mainland Finland, for example, gaming operators use TUPAS (Finanssiala. 2011.) to 
identify online customers. Almost all identifications requiring strong authentication in 
Finland are done using this method, and most people are familiar with its use whether 
in banking, insurance or communicating online with government or municipal 
authorities. For them, it is only natural the identification is done this way upon sign-up. 
TUPAS supplies the operator with the name and the for each resident unique personal 
number. The personal number is then by the operator automatically checked against 
VRK system (owned by Väestörekisterikeskus, Finnish population registry) to establish 
that the municipality of residence of the playing customer is in Mainland Finland. It is 
highly unlikely someone would give away their internet bank usernames, passwords 
and keycode cards; Thus we can be quite sure that in most cases the playing customer 
is who they claim they are. 
With gaming operators offering their services in several different markets, issues with 
identification turn more complicated: Operators can not accommodate for all countries' 
different personal number or identity document number systems – some countries have 
no identity cards, while in others having one and carrying it with oneself is obligatory – 
not all countries are willing to share their citizens' information, not to mention interfacing 
this with a foreign gambling company gaming system - and in no country would this come 
for free. What we then ”know” in the beginning is what the playing customer wants to tell 
us at sign-up. This is often where the Fraud Management Team and the Marketing Team 
will have their first fight: Marketing teams or teams responsible for the website front-end 
customer experience want to keep the sign-up as easy and short as possible. For the 
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Fraud Team, anything the playing customer enters can and in suspect cases will be used 
to evaluate the truthfulness of the rest of the information, and more than a bare minimum 
number of fields is a ”nice to have”.   The bare minimum would be name, date of birth, 
language, country of residence, email address and a password – and maybe a mobile 
phone number. 
3.2 One-account policy 
Practically thinking all online money gaming sites have a one-account policy: One 
playing customer can only have one gaming account. There are several reasons to this: 
In some countries or jurisdictions, the legislation or the local money gaming license may 
simply so require. In order for Anti Money Laundering measures to be effective, one 
account policy is convenient:  A player might try to avoid exceeding a money laundering 
detection and reporting threshold by using multiple accounts, which, unless somehow 
linked together would count as separate individuals (Kuustie. 2015, 15). In the same 
way, single account policy is needed by the operators in order to set effective limits to 
the number and amount of individual customers' payments and to prevent customers 
from avoiding these payments limitations: The restrictions are tight enough to stop any 
individual customer at any situation from causing excessive financial damage to the 
operator when making use of just one account. Limiting gaming accounts to one per 
person helps to keep sports betting professionals in bay, too: There are some to the 
gaming companies well-known professional sports betting experts, who know how to 
count odds and combinations of different betting products very well – all too well. The 
gaming operators want to limit these persons' bets and sometimes follow their activity 
closely to spot their own typos or mistakes in calculations - or ban them totally from 
sports betting and in many cases offer them a job. Money gaming is not a human right 
or allemansratt, and the operators, licensed or not, whether government monopolies or 
private, can still select their customers.  A single account policy is needed also for the 
operators to prevent promotion abuse, players signing up several times to claim sign-up 
or other one-time, one-per-customer bonuses or offers. Also, many operators need to 
uphold some kind of responsible gaming limitations, in order to at least seemingly protect 
the customers from excessive playing: In Malta, for example, the operator has to close 
the gaming account if a playing customer confesses to a gaming addiction, and keep it 
closed. Under British gaming license, a gaming account must be permanently closed if 
the customer so says. Responsible gaming limitations are often in place to justify a 
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government control or a total monopoly over money gaming: If a monopoly operator fails 
to show commitment in  prevention of gaming addiction or limiting the problems caused 
by excessive playing, it gives a reason for the proponents of deregulation to strive for 
ending money gaming monopolies through EU common market policies, for example. 
And it is only smart to keep the customer database tidy even just for tidiness sake : We 
do not know for sure, for example, what is the basis of taxes or dues to gaming 
companies going to be five years from now: It is only good housekeeping to know how 
many individual customers there really are. For a serious money gaming operator 
wanting to learn about the past, to know the present situation and to predict the future, a 
well-enforced single account policy is a key to more accurate reporting, better marketing 
analysis and ultimately survival and success in the extremely competitive industry of 
money gaming. 
There are very few exceptions to one-account policy: If a playing customer moves to 
another country, the old account must be closed and a new one opened due to taxes 
and other possible issues having to do with how the local legislation treats money 
gaming. The gaming account and payments currency might also need a change; having 
a mismatch here might lead into excessive payment service fees. Also, those accounts 
that have been opened by minors using a false date of birth must be closed, if the players 
want to start playing again once they are of age. 
3.3 Payment methods 
It is very important that the customers will find suitable and convenient payment methods 
in order to make a deposit i.e. to transfer money to the gaming operator's bank account, 
which would then show in the balance on the customer's gaming account. Gaming 
operators offer a variety of different payment methods: Online payments, offline 
payments, credit card, debit card, e-wallet, and paysafe card, to mention the most 
common ones. In the near future, mobile platforms will be widely surpassing desktop 
computers even in money gaming, and mobile payments such as Alipay are likely to 
become the most popular method. But this is from a security and costs point of view 
going to be comparable to online payments.  
Online Payments 
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Online payment is by far the most convenient payment payment method from a Fraud 
Team point of view: In order to make an online payment, there must be sufficient funds 
on the bank account, and the person making the payment needs to know the login codes 
to the online bank and possess some other information, perhaps a keycode card, a 
security key or a mobile phone with a keycode app. It is the banking customers' 
responsibility not to reveal or give away these to any third parties, which makes these 
payments virtually risk-free to their recipients. Domestic online payments have a low 
cost, too. Online payments, however, require an uninterrupted internet connection to 
function instantaneously: The player starts from the gaming operator's payment page, 
selects the amount and the bank and gets redirected to his bank's online payments. After 
the necessary authentications, the funds are deducted from the player's bank account at 
the very moment of payment and the gaming operator gets this information when the 
customer is automatically redirected back to the operator gaming website, and the funds 
are added to the player's gaming account, even though the gaming operator will only 
receive the funds from the bank after a certain time the payment needs for processing. 
But if there is an interruption after the payment and the customer fails to get redirected 
back, the payment becomes an offline payment. In this case, the player's gaming 
account is first credited when the funds appear at the gaming operator's bank account 
with the relevant reference number. 
Offline Payments 
Apart from online payments getting interrupted, offline payments are otherwise almost 
obsolete in online gaming: They were used before online payments came into existence 
or into wide use. In an offline payment, the player gets a bank account number and a 
reference number from the gaming operator to use, and the funds will show up on the 
gaming account when the gaming operator receives them in a couple of days' time. 
E-wallets 
From the payment recipient point of view, e-wallets are a risk-free payment method: The 
payment service provider assumes the risk. This is reflected in very high service fees; 
How the costs are shared between the gaming operator and the player is up to the 
operator: Often the deposits would be kept free, but the number of free withdrawals might 
be limited to one per month, for example, and a fee would be taken for any subsequent 
ones. From a player's point of view, e-wallets are far from one-click shopping: Money 
first has to be transferred, normally from the player's bank account to the e-wallet before 
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it can be further used. This may take several days. E-wallets are popular among players, 
who frequently use multiple gaming sites, however, because e-wallets are always there 
as a payment method, and payments and withdrawals to and from e-wallets are 
instantaneous, which further explains their popularity. E-wallet service providers also 
offer debit cards linked to the e-wallet, which makes it more convenient to the player. 
The most well-known e-wallet payment service providers are Skrill  (formerly 
Moneybookers, a name that may suggest its popularity in online money gaming, 
especially odds) and Neteller. 
Credit card payments 
One sometimes hears people wonder why credit card payments are allowed in online 
money gaming at all – that one should not use borrowed money to unnecessities such 
as gambling. But the credit card is the most universal payment method: People all over 
the world have credit cards and they are being used to buy all kinds of goods and 
services everywhere, without judging whether they are necessary or not; That is what 
makes it so popular. Online, however, a credit card transaction is always a CNP (Card 
not present) transaction: The player can not show the card to the payment recipient at 
the time of the transaction. Because of the increase in risk, the fees for these kinds of 
transactions are likely to be higher than when swiping the physical card.  
Debit card payments 
Debit card payments are essentially similar to credit card payments, with the exception 
of Visa Electron cards, in which case there needs to be money on the account or an 
agreed overdraft in order to make a payment. 
Paysafe Card 
Paysafe card is a prepaid card used for anonymous online shopping. The cards are sold 
at various outlets in different currencies and denominations, and even online. The fees 
are high, currently up to 15% for low transaction volumes. (Paysafecard. 2018.)  
3.4 Gaming behavior – Game categories 
Gaming operators offer a variety of different kinds of games: Some are specialised in 
Poker (Pokerstars, Fulltiltpoker), or Odds (Unibet) – The biggest operators offer games 
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from virtually all categories online games: Slot machines, table games, odds, poker, 
lotteries, bingo, to name a few. 
Slot machines – a.k.a. fruit slots, fruit machines, the slots, poker machines, one-armed 
bandits are the cash cow of money gaming industry. The games are extremely popular: 
Anyone can start playing right away, because little or no skills are needed. Games come 
with dozens of different themes, different bet levels, different winning structures. 
Slotmachines are to the gaming operator risk-free: Their long term average return rate 
(theoretical payout percentage) is fixed, usually way over 90%. The biggest jackpots 
available in some slots are cumulative, which means that the amount paid out will never 
exceed that of the money reserved for the jackpot. Poker machines are in almost every 
respect similar to slotmachines - in distinction from online Poker games against real 
opponents, a very important distinction from a fraud team point of view. 
Table games are the casino games that traditionally have, unlike slot machines, been 
played on a table. The most popular table games are Baccarat, Blackjack, Red Dog and 
Roulette. The individual stakes are usually higher than with slotmachines and the pace 
is somewhat slower. The rate of return and the best strategies for each of these games 
are well-known – And in the long run the house always wins: Card-counting or any similar 
fraudulent behavior sometimes reported from real-life physical casinos is not possible 
online. 
Odds or sports betting is probably the oldest form of money gaming in the world, and it 
is nowadays not limited to sports only, but it is possible to play the odds on various other 
things, too, almost anything from entertainment to politics. Many online gaming operators 
are offering live odds, a possibility to place bets while an event is still taking place. The 
playing customers can then place bets on, for example, which team will score the next 
goal, or change their bet about the outcome of the game – with new odds and/or with a 
cost, of course. The fast pace of live odds makes the games more addictive and gives 
the operator the possibility to sell more products. 
From a gaming operator point of view, offering odds is costly: The volumes need to be 
big, if odds are compiled in-house. Many operators choose to partly or fully buy this 
service from an external service provider specialised in odds compiling (such as Kambi). 
Even when buying the odds compiling service, the operator can still decide which 
products and odds to offer: The operator is responsible for handing the payments, bets 
and ultimately paying out the winnings. There are various websites listing the odds 
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offered by different operators for different events and products. These are often 
presented as tables where it is easy to compare which operator offers the best odds. 
This makes the margins even smaller. 
Poker is something that most people probably first think about, when money gaming is 
mentioned. In poker games, two or more players play against each other, and their 
decisions can and will affect the outcome of a game. From an operator point of view it 
does not matter who wins: Operator profits come from rake, i.e. the commission or fee 
for each hand played. 
There are some operators specialised in poker games with in-house development of the 
games. Most operators, however, use external service providers (such as Microgaming, 
Bossmedia, OnGame) that take care of providing the gaming platform as well as 
connecting this with a number of other operators with playing customers so that they can 
all play against each other: The playing customers can then find games, levels and 
opponents they like virtually around the clock.  
The most common types of fraud occurring in poker games are Chip dumping (losing 
funds intentionally to an opponent) and Collusion (two or more players are colluding i.e. 
collaborating against the other players in a multiplayer table by sharing information with 
each other or raising the stakes according to a plan agreed to in advance among 
themselves, trying to get advantage of the game this way). 
3.5 Promotions: analysis, affiliate marketing 
All gaming operators have some kinds of promotional campaigns in order to lure in new 
players to sign  up, or to have the existing players make a deposit (into their gaming 
account) or to otherwise increase their gaming activity. Sign-up bonuses are often money 
bonuses, free bets, freespins, lottery tickets or gifts – or a combination of these. 
Activation bonuses – bonuses offered to all customers or to old customers that have not 
had recent real money gaming activity - can be any of these, or, for example, an 
opportunity to place a value bet on the player's favourite team on an important game. 
The operator may target certain groups or individuals and offer bonus codes. These can 
be unique for one-time use only or a general one-code-fits-all for a bigger audience, 
depending on the media (email, posters, leaflets, brochures, websites) and the kind of 
bonus. For money bonuses (a.k.a. bonus money) there is always a turnover requirement: 
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The player needs to bet the bonus amount a certain number of times in certain products 
before the winnings can be withdrawn, used in other product categories or transferred to 
(other) external gaming service provider games. Similarly, the possible winnings from 
slotmachine freespins or free sports bets usually have a turnover requirement before the 
funds can be withdrawn. What kind of bonuses the players make use of upon signup or 
when making payments tells a lot about them when assessing the risks they might pose. 
Affiliate marketing is the most common way for the gaming operators to acquire new 
players. Affiliates in this case are the individuals or companies, which promote the 
gaming sites on their own websites or events. They might get a one-time fee for a new 
player signing up and making a first deposit, or a commission, share of the gaming 
operators' revenue from such players. Affiliates may offer new players sign-up bonuses 
as agreed to with the operator; These might vary from affiliate to affiliate and be more 
generous-looking and better suited to a specific market or population than the operator's 
usual offers. The players who come through an affiliate have this tagged to their gaming 
accounts; What kind of an affiliate it is might reveal something about the players. And of 
course, when there are affiliates, there is always a possibility for affiliate fraud, too.  
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4  FRAUD MANAGEMENT TASKS AND TOOLS IN 
PRACTICE 
Life in a simple, small World would be easy: We would only operate in one developed 
country where virtually all the people are used to online payments and strong 
authentication in their everyday lives, and we would have access to the population 
registry of that country. We would only offer casino games – slotmachines and table 
games. We would not have promotional campaigns with money bonuses. We would not 
need worry about checking identity - it would be automatised and done upon sign-up. 
Payment risks would be non-existent; And no-one can cheat an online slotmachine. No 
promotions, no promotion abuse! 
Few operators with gaming sites matching the above description exist. Big operators with 
their shareholders wanting more and more do not settle for just one market with a limited 
set of products. Life then becomes more complicated, little by little. 
4.1 Identity checks 
Different countries have different identity documents and different everyday practices of 
checking identity: In Spain, the modern ID card with a unique personal number (DNI) is 
mandatory and everybody has to keep it with them at all times. Until fairly recently 
Portugal had paper ID cards with the holder photo glued on and a fingerprint in ink. In 
UK, there are no ID cards at all: Those who travel, have passports, but otherwise the 
only document everyone has is the birth certificate. Identification is then often based on 
a recent household bill, which shows the name and the address, alone or together with 
the birth certificate. For this reason paper-shredders are popular items in British homes: 
One does not want to leave potential identification documents in rubbish bins for 
someone to collect. -It might come as a surprise to many, that the driving license is not 
generally accepted as an identity document in EU. 
Because strong online authentication is not something people have access to in all 
markets, or the because operator deems an integration with such systems not feasible 
in a market, identity has to be checked in another way. The operator may request the 
identity documents: Some operators require the documents be sent by email, some 
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gaming sites have a specific upload function for these. There are a couple of 
considerations, when deciding upon the solution: 
-Responsibility for security and confidentiality: When submitting documents by email, the 
playing customer consciously assumes some risk and responsibility, when it comes to 
the security of their internet connection, email service provider etc. In contrast, with a 
document upload function on a website, the player has the right to assume, that the 
operator has taken the necessary safety precautions when it comes to the encryption 
when uploading and storing the documents on a safe (separate) server, with access 
limited to only those working with the documents. 
-Images of identity documents need to be checked against the gaming account 
information, and the account marked accordingly: Which documents (ID, proof of 
address, proof of bank account holder, credit card, CCA-form, face verification) have 
been submitted by the player, which have been approved by the Fraud Team - or 
rejected and the reason for this. The information must be conveyed to the player, and it 
needs to be available to the Fraud Team, even Customer Support. The Fraud team might 
want to take another look at the images at a later stage.  
-Initial implementation time and costs are in favor of the email solution: The inbox is 
already there at no (significant) extra cost. Planning, defining, designing and 
implementing an upload function takes time and occupies resources that could be used 
on activities that bring in money. 
Company A used to work on an email based solution. But there was no designated field 
in the gaming system for the status of identity documents. When receiving an email with 
such documents, the approval of documents was marked in backoffice in a free form text 
field originally intended for customer support random notes (for which it was used 
constantly, too).  The same text strings were used every time to mark the status and kind 
of an identity check, making it both understandable to everybody involved, and, 
searchable through database searches. The Fraud Team each time replied, sent an 
email to the playing customer signalling about the documents approval. 
Company B made use of the upload solution. The playing customer would on the upload 
page see, which documents are pending approval (i.e. uploaded), and which ones have 
been approved or rejected.  The Fraud Team would only need to tick the right checkbox, 
”approved” or ”rejected” and in case of rejection, select the reason for rejection from a 
list. 
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Neither one was a perfect solution: Company A case, plain quick-and-dirty, though some 
might argue receiving a non-automatized email brings an extra personal touch to 
customer experience. 
Company B case was not bad. But from a playing customer point of view, more of the 
available information could have been used to communicate the situation in the customer 
home page on the gaming site, at a (constantly) visible place: Most importantly, when 
documents are requested or rejected. This to avoid unnecessary strain on Customer 
Service and ultimately Fraud Team, which end up having to deal with questions that 
remain unanswered or of which the answer is not easily spotted by the playing 
customers. The reason for rejecting a document should have a free text field in addition 
to the few available options to better describe the problem to the player and to improve 
the success rate at a next upload attempt. The upload function had a filesize limit, of 
course, but it was set unnecessarily low, which resulted in players not being able to 
upload images taken with normal, modern mobile phones or consumer market digital 
cameras. –  Frustrated with this or not knowing better, some players would end up 
reducing the image size to that of a postage stamp before upload: At Company B this 
led into an unnecessary argument with players, who insisted we zoom in to get the image 
bigger in order to see its contents clearly: Resizing an image and the consequences of 
a resize is not rocket science, but it is still far harder than playing slotmachines. From a 
Fraud Team point of view, a bigger image is always better: It is easier to point out 
manipulation attempts. There is no point for a filesize limit of, say, under 15Mb. Also, the 
player should (almost) in every case be allowed to log in with the right credentials even 
for documents upload only; even when all other functionality of the gaming account would 
for one reason or another have been disabled by the operator personnel. This is so that 
the documents end up in the right place and the account gets marked accordingly in 
every situation. (”Almost” here because of possible legal restrictions.) 
Checking an image is very different from checking a real, physical identity document: 
Real documents have a certain touch and feel – even smell. 3-D prints, holograms and 
watermarks are not necessarily showing in an image. Real-life documents often change 
their appearance in UV-light and have an NFC-chip.  
Fraud Teams have access to online catalogues of specimen images and information of 
different countries' identity documents: Both current and older versions. The images 
have the main security features introduced. The information may include details such as 
the normal validity period of the document, and to whom such documents are granted, 
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and a description of the contents of the optically machine-readable field plus algorithms 
to count the checksums of such fields or scripts to do that online: Should there be a 
mismatch, the image certainly has been tampered with. Specimen images appear on 
many governmental authorities' websites, too, and the images can be used in many 
creative ways: Company A Fraud Team received at least half a dozen driving license 
images from different players in a period of a couple of months, all with the same face 
photo. They were all photoshopped, using an image the players had downloaded from a 
Swedish driving license authority website. Sometimes a Fraud Team would ask in good 
photos of documents rather than scanned images: These are more difficult to fake. And 
image files might contain metadata with information on the camera make and model, 
software, serial number, settings, time the image was created – almost anything, even 
the location. Of course this can be easily manipulated, too, but the data – or the absence 
of it - might sometimes help in decision-making. 
Playing customer gaming account information entered by the player upon sign-up (or a 
later stage) is compared with the identity document data. This is not always as simple as 
it sounds: Different countries have different conventions when it comes to names and 
their use: In some countries only one first name is used, in others it is common to list all 
the given names. In Spain, both surnames (primer apellido, segundo apellido) are always 
used. This is an issue that should already be tackled with when designing the sign-up 
page and the databases, though no gaming operator will probably ever cater for each 
and every country's peculiarities. Another challenge is the transliteration of some 
languages into Latin alphabet: While the identity document information can be in Cyrillic 
only, for example, there are many ways people might try to transliterate their names. 
Experienced Fraud Analysts and International Fraud Teams with employees from 
different markets can usually spot attempts to go around the one-account policy, for 
example, players might try using different, from the norm deviating combinations of first 
and last names or their transliterations. 
Sometimes there is an obvious mismatch between the information on the identity 
document and what the player has submitted upon sign-up. Was is a mistake or was it a 
deliberate attempt to cheat the system? -People do make mistakes, especially with 
poorly localized and designed websites: Dates are the most common thing, because 
they are written differently in different countries. It is upon the Fraud Team's best 
judgement and company policy to decide, how to deal with these accounts. Legislation, 
too, has its say: If a player had ”accidentally” signed up with a Malta-based operator 
while underage, the account would be permanently closed. 
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If the sign-up data in one or more markets contains a Personal Number (PN, SSN, DNI), 
this will help Fraud Teams to more easily distinguish between individual players. It is 
highly unlikely someone would make a mistake when typing their personal number, 
because these usually have one or more checksum characters, and a good interface 
would prompt the user to check the input value if this does not match. One might argue 
that giving a player the opportunity to sign up with an entirely false Personal Number 
would make it easier to detect fraud. The most user-friendly interface is, however, 
designed with honest players in mind: They are the vast majority.  Fraud teams may 
have a manual online access to population registries to compare the sign-up data  
against these. In some very open societies like Sweden, these registers are available to 
virtually anybody – even identity thieves – which might complicate assessing the true 
identity of a player. 
Proof of Address – The Utility Bill 
It is a common practice, that the Fraud Team requests an image of a recent Utility Bill 
(electricity, water, gas bill, bank statement or an official letter) alongside with the ID. 
There are a couple of reasons for this: The Operator wants to verify the player address, 
residence, but identity documents seldom have the street address included, as in 
Poland. The Utility Bill also serves as an extra check about the ID: An ID can be valid for 
5 or 10 years, even a lifetime in certain countries and circumstances. Asking in a recent 
Utility Bill helps make sure the ID is in right hands, not lost, stolen, copied, borrowed or 
inherited. 
Face Verification 
If there are further doubts about an ID being in wrong hands, the Fraud Team may want 
to do a Face Verification: Ask the player send in a photo of him/herself holding the identity 
document (usually passport) next to their face.  
Phone Verification 
Sometimes everything about the documents looks good or very good, but the gaming 
behavior is uncommon or has suddenly changed, especially in Odds. The player may 
then get a kind phone call from a Fraud Team employee or the Customer Service with a 
set of questions to verify, that it is really him/her, who has been playing. A phone 
verification may also be used, when players have lost their login credentials and/or 
access to their email account. 
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4.2 Payments 
As is the case with identification, payments, too, are relatively easy to handle and 
implement, if the working environment is just one to the operator very well-known market 
with one predominant, safe, trustworthy and affordable payment method, such as online 
payments in Finland. Internationally oriented gaming operators, who want to scour in 
every penny from each and every potential playing customer in the World, however, do 
not have the luxury of sticking to one payment method only. 
Credit card payments 
From a Fraud Team's point of view, credit card payments can be a nightmare: Credit 
cards can be copied or skimmed – and the mere information on the card is in many cases 
enough to make a payment online: The card number, cardholder name, expiry date and 
cvc-code.  
Online money games are a high-risk product in contrast with physical items purchased 
online, shipped to a certain individual with a known address with a few days' (or weeks' 
as in Finland) delivery time; Or airline e-tickets which are registered to an individual 
whose identity is always checked at the airport before the flight. In online money gaming 
the product is delivered instantly in a virtual form. Some kind of further risk management 
is certainly necessary. 
An operator may choose to handle the credit card payments by themselves or make use 
of an external payment service provider. PCI DSS (Payment Card Industry Data Security 
Standard) dictates what is required from an online merchant in order to handle these 
payments. The standards are very demanding, reaching from what information about the 
cards and cardholders can be collected and stored, where, and how – down to the 
physical safety and surveillance of the premises and the server rooms. Fulfilling the 
standards might sound too tedious to a smaller operator; On the other hand, shouldn't 
these things be more of less in order, anyway, when handling huge sums of money and 
confidential information!  
Credit card payment risk management is about adjusting risk scores: Certain actions add 
to the risk score, some actions more than others. If the risk score limit is exceeded, the 
payment will be rejected. It is important to find a balance: If one wants to get rid of all the 
risks involved, one does not accept any payments at all, but that is not very good for 
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business. If one accepts all the payments with any cards chances are, that losses due 
to credit card fraud will be huge. 
There need to be limits: How much money can be transferred and how fast: One must 
limit the amount (sum) per transaction and set a limit to the number of transactions per 
card per day. How many successful payments or failed attempts per card or IP can we 
allow for? How many cards per person? -Using a big external payment service provider 
may prove less risky than handling the payments in-house: They may have more data 
about payments and payment attempts from specific IP addresses and with specific 
cards: The risk score limit might have been exceeded elsewhere long before the first 
attempt with another Operator. 
A few parameters in risk management have to do with location: For example, the 
cardholder country of residence, the country where the transaction is initiated 
(geolocation from IP address) and the card issuer country – and combinations of these: 
If all of the three in this example are the same, it would result in no added risk points. 
But what about a Finnish cardholder travelling in Sweden, USA, Nigeria or The 
Philippines? What is the likely risk and business impact? It is not necessary or hardly 
even possible to create a perfect matrix with all the different combinations; One can 
always whitelist individual cards, if a known high-roller happens to enjoy the holidays 
playing from an exotic location. 
There are even security solutions counting the speed of the customer between 
transactions: If the geolocation between two transactions changes faster than what a 
feasible travelling time between the two locations would be, the transaction is denied. 
With the increasing popularity of VPNs, the likelihood of both false positives and 
negatives here needs to be addressed, when it comes to all IP-based geolocation data 
use: False positives through an addition in the gaming service Terms and Conditions for 
the players banning VPN use, and advising the players accordingly. 
Credit Card Chargebacks 
If credit card details end up in wrong hands, it may be used for payments online until the 
credit limit has been reached, or until the card issuer or payment service provider fraud 
team notice something out of the ordinary and gets the card cancelled – or until the 
cardholder checks their credit card bill and notifies the credit card issuer about payments 
they do not recognize. The cardholders can dispute any online credit card transaction 
made with their credit cards: The card has not been physically present, swiped, when 
the payment was made. If and when the credit card issuer chooses to believe the 
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cardholder – they always do - they initiate a chargeback process: The card issuer sends 
an inquiry to the gaming operator with the payment details: Date and time, sum, 
reference, 4 first and 4 last digits of the card number and the reason code for the 
chargeback, most commonly ”Fraud (card-not-present)/No cardholder authorisation” or 
”Transaction not recognised”. Unless the operator can convince the card issuer, that the 
cardholder has been the one using the card for the payment and that the cardholder has 
received what they were supposed to receive, a chargeback will take place, i.e. The card 
issuer will withdraw the disputed funds from the operator and the operator needs to pay 
a chargeback penalty fee for each transaction; If the number of chargebacks is very high, 
even penalty fines in order of up to $100 per transaction. The total cost of a chargeback 
may easily become greater than two times the initial payment. 
To avoid chargebacks, the Operators may choose to accept credit card payments with 
3-D Secure protocol only, or give negative risk points for payments using the protocol. 
The best-known implementations of 3-D Secure are Verified by Visa and MasterCard 
SecureCode. When using 3-D Secure protocol, the customer is after initiating the 
payment (by entering the sum, cardholder name, card number, expiry date and cvc code) 
taken to the issuing bank website for additional verification: This can be, for example, by 
SMS with a verification code to the customer's mobile phone, or by strong authentication 
using one time passwords. It is then very difficult for the customer to dispute the payment. 
3-D Secure protocol is not cheap to implement as a merchant: The initial cost may be 
the final straw that turns the decision towards using an external payment service 
provider, unless the volumes are substantial. From a player point of view, 3-D Secure 
adds more complexity to the payment: It is no longer anywhere close to one-click 
shopping, but rather makes a credit card payment resemble an online payment. From 
an operator point of view this is not entirely bad, if it leads to players switching  payment 
methods to online payments. But a thought of the credit card making Global mobility 
easy might go into shatters: SMS verification requirement  renders the credit card 
effectively useless abroad, unless the customer's mobile phone deal allows for roaming.  
When considering payment risk to the Operator, credit card payments are the only 
payment method really worth mentioning: With the other available payment methods the 
risk is on player or payment service provider side: The players are responsible for 
keeping their bank and other payment related credentials from getting into wrong hands, 
the banks and other payment service providers have their own responsibilities, based on 
laws and agreements. Adding other payment methods, however, adds to withdrawal 
methods – and risk. 
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4.3 Withdrawals 
A vast majority of playing customers want to withdraw the possible winnings to the same 
place, where they made their deposits from. From the risk-averse operator point of view 
this is also an ideal situation: There is little point in anybody to commit a fraud while 
making a payment, and withdrawing any funds to the same bank account or instrument. 
In countries such as Malta, where online gaming is extremely regulated, the legislation, 
too, directs the operators to act in this way. 
There are a couple of considerations, though: Online gaming is a highly competitive 
market, and timely withdrawals are one of the most important wants of the playing 
customers, a way for an operator to make a difference. Another one is the cost: Some 
withdrawal methods are to the operator more costly than others. And, most importantly: 
Not all payment methods, instruments or their implementations allow for withdrawals. 
There are several likely scenarios which all will happen, if there is a to the playing 
customers a free choice of from each other totally independent payment and withdrawal 
methods, without limitations to transfers: 
Money laundering at its simplest form will happen, for example: A customer deposits 10 
Euros from Bank Account A and 10000 Euros from Bank Account B to his gaming 
account. He withdraws 10010 Euros from his gaming account to Bank Account A. The 
money is now clean: The customer may claim he won a jackpot at the online casino with 
a bet of 10 Euros. The operator suffers the transaction fees and possibly gets sued for 
assisting with money laundering. 
Credit Card Fraud will happen, for example: A customer deposits 200 Euros to his 
gaming account using an unsecured credit card transaction. The card used was a copied, 
skimmed or stolen one. He then withdraws the funds to an anonymous paysafe card. 
The operator suffers the transaction costs and possibly a chargeback with the 
chargeback fee involved. 
In the case above, the card does not need to be a stolen one: The customer may use 
his own, unsecured card and decide to dispute the payment, initiate a chargeback 
procedure; For some mysterious reason unknown to me, this would be called ”Friendly 
Chargeback”.  
Transfer from a credit card to another instrument will happen, for example: Banks would 
charge a service fee plus commission (2 Euros + 2%, for example), if a customer wants 
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to withdraw money from their credit card to their bank account. However, there is no 
service fee for the customer, if they purchase services or products online with the card. 
The customer makes a deposit of 1000 Euros from the credit card to the gaming account. 
From a bank point of view this counts as a purchase of gaming services. The customer 
then withdraws 1000 euros from his gaming account to his bank account. The operator 
suffers the transaction fees. 
Similarly to the case above, a customer may want to speed up a transfer of funds from 
an e-wallet to his bank account or go around the possible service fees using the gaming 
account in between.  
Ultimately, some customers will try start using the gaming service as a bank, paying their 
bills, debts, whatnot, from their gaming account to various payees' bank accounts. In this 
case, the transaction fees are just a tiny fraction of the losses for the operator: 
Administrative costs will outnumber them easily, when Customer Service, Payments and 
Fraud Teams are trying to figure out what went wrong, when a customer says his friend 
claims not tho have received the money the customer sent from the gaming account to 
the friend's bank account the other day. Not to talk about Payday loans' a.k.a. Quick cash 
loans' funds appearing at the operator bank account without any indication to which 
playing customer gaming account they would belong to. 
To avoid the above scenarios, all gaming operators state in their rules and regulations 
in one way or another, that deposits should be done in gaming purpose only. In practise, 
the player should bet at least a total of the sum of the deposits once before requesting a 
withdrawal. Otherwise the operator would impose a fee to cover the costs. 
Sometimes the payment method and instrument used for a payment are not available 
for a withdrawal: Some cards or card issuers do not allow for this or the card might have 
reached its expiry date. An e-wallet or a bank account may have been terminated. In 
these cases, typically, the operator asks the player to withdraw the funds to a bank 
account: The player needs to enter the sum to withdraw, IBAN and BIC and the name of 
the bank account holder. In some countries and banks, these need to match, otherwise 
the transaction will be rejected. This can be very strict: In China, for example, even the 
case needs to match for names written using Latin alphabet: If the name at the bank is 
written with all upper case letters, that needs to be the case with the withdrawal request. 
In Finland, so far, this is not necessary: Any string looking like a name will probably do. 
This is not a challenge just for the Fraud Team, but for the occasional customer, who 
types in a wrong account number. If an account with a given account number exists, the 
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funds will end up there, whoever the account belongs to. If no such account exists, the 
funds will be returned to the operator and the Payments Team will need to manually put 
them back where they belong. 
 Optimally, the player side user interface would always suggest only withdrawal methods, 
instruments and amounts that match with the payment methods, whenever available. 
But truly international operators have a number of constantly changing payment 
methods, and each change comes with their implementation cost and time. Integration 
teams' resources are often very limited, and downtime is expensive. Everything is a 
compromise: If it weren't so, there would be little use to operative Payments, Fraud or 
Customer Service teams. 
4.4 Gaming behavior 
Truly international gaming operators, who want to scour in every penny available in the 
World shall also provide most games, of all different categories. Casino games, 
especially slotmachines are the cash cow; offering other game categories is often as 
much a means to bringing in more customers to play these as it is for the profits from the 
games themselves. 
Poker 
Typically, a big operator would offer poker games through a couple of external service 
providers (ESP). These ESPs, in their turn, offer their services to a number of gaming 
operators of which the players then would find games, opponents and levels of their 
liking.  
In order to play, the player needs to transfer money from the gaming account at the 
gaming operator to a poker wallet at an ESP. Depending on the operators and ESPs, 
this can be done manually for a player selected sum, or automatically with the full gaming 
account balance (a.k.a. ”seamless wallet”). Similarly, depending on thedoesn't technical 
solution, the player can transfer money from the wallet at an ESP back to the gaming 
account or the account balance is automatically kept up-to-date.  
In poker, the players can with their decisions and actions affect the outcome of a game: 
It may not be possible to win every time at will, but it certainly is possible to lose every 
time. Losing money intentionally (usually to the player known person) a.k.a. Chip 
Dumping is categorically forbidden on all online poker sites. At first glance losing at poker 
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tables does not sound like a smart move: For why would the Operators or Fraud Teams 
be interested in someone wanting to get rid of their money! Losing money, however, 
means that another someone is going to get that money - that money minus rake. 
(Despite conspiracy theories, the poker operators do not need to employ people to 
anonymously or with varying aliases to play, win money for the house. The house just 
gets the rake, which is basically a commission for organizing the game. It is for the house 
irrelevant who wins a game – the house always wins, gets the rake, anyway.)  This opens 
a new path for the money to flow: The money is no longer bound to one Operator, but 
the funds lost by a player from one Operator can later find their way to another player's 
gaming account at another Operator, perhaps in another country, with their own set of 
payment and withdrawal methods, and routines for identity checks, screening and 
monitoring. 
It is possible for the ESPs and even Operators to monitor the games in real-time. With 
hundreds or thousands of hands being played at any moment, there is little use to this 
feature by itself: Any monitoring needs to be automatized and triggers set for automatic 
actions and alerting the Fraud Teams.  
Loss-per-hand is the most often used metric: How much money per player per played 
poker hand is being lost. The monitoring systems automatically calculate this for every 
hand, and take action, if a threshold is exceeded: Send a report to the ESP Fraud Team 
and the Operator Fraud Team for checking. Most cases are blatantly obvious, but 
sometimes a manual check monitoring the player activity by watching a game live or 
studying through the playing history hand by hand in search for signs of chip-dumping 
might prove difficult: Not every case is sky-clear: It is not always easy or possible to 
identify, whether the intention has been chip-dumping, or if someone is just very bad at 
poker. Creating AI for something that is this much dependent on human behaviour or 
psychology is unlikely to succeed at this level. If the players involved in chip dumping 
are cunning and more than the usual two, the funds could easily vanish from a river into 
smaller streams, soon beyond reach. The funds can in the end be gathered again back 
together from the smaller streams, under radar: If the perpetrator or the perpetrators are 
very patient using ”players” in different geographical locations, operators, IP addresses, 
ISP:s and computers, it is possible that they may succeed in avoiding detection: 
However, a tiny mistake with any of the above may reveal the whole plot. 
A better but more complicated approach to following the money would be tagging the 
funds to the players at entry points of the poker ESP: In this way, we would always know 
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how much and what proportion of the funds of any player originates from a certain other 
player, whatever the way or method it got there: This could in its turn be compared to the 
number of hands played, how long ago the player registered or any other relevant or 
interesting parameter. If the check is only executed upon a transfer request, we could 
avoid false positives and much of the unnecessary manual checks and monitoring. Of 
course it is totally up to the Poker ESPs to decide on their level and methods of detecting 
and reporting chip dumping: It is just another feature among many others that the 
Operators may need to consider, when selecting suitable ESPs – Probably way down, 
close to the bottom of the shopping list. 
Poker together with credit card payments is an extremely dangerous combination: Funds 
from a credit card payment at one operator can be chip-dumped to a player at another 
and withdrawn in a minute, if no checks are in place. Even with them, information flow 
between Operators' and ESPs' Fraud Teams is often too slow to stop the funds before it 
is too late, and an occasional hit-and-run chip-dumper might well succeed. At Company 
B, each new player had a Poker Loss Limit, a specific total sum, amount that a player is 
allowed to lose in Poker. This limit would only be removed or raised if payment methods 
for the player are limited to the safe and secure ones – such as online payments – or 
after a thorough identification and signing of a CCA form. When talking to poker players, 
asking them about their success, practically all players claim they are winning players or 
at least around break-even. The first situation in which they need to confront the truth is 
when they hit the Poker Loss Limit and contact the Operator. Fortunately, this is a much 
more common reason for a customer contact than any fraud suspicion. 
Obviously, similar risks are present with any multiplayer games where the players can 
significantly affect the outcome.  
Identity checks, screening and monitoring done by operators function quite like security 
checks at airports: Once you have passed the security check at one airport, it is possible 
you may not need to go through another one, because of mutual trust between some 
airports. Similarly, there needs to be some kind of trust between operators and ESP:s 
about the origin of the players and their funds. And if an operator is too lax with the 
security checks, chances are they will one day suffer a hit themselves, getting an 
unsecured credit card payment of their own player chip-dumped to another of their own 
players and withdrawn. 
32 
4.5  Promotional campaigns 
Getting new customers and keeping the old ones active is the single most difficult thing 
about online gaming. A big international operator is big only, when it has many active 
playing customers. How many? -The CEO or the spokesperson of the Operator would 
most likely say the number of their active players a business secret. A business analyst 
would ask you to define an active player: It must be someone who deposits money to 
the gaming account and plays the games. Depositing alone brings no gaming revenue: 
If the player happens to pass away right after making a deposit before playing, for 
example, the inheritors may still insist the funds must be returned. (In fact, one gaming 
operator in Finland already has the necessary technology, integration in place to 
automatically pay out the remaining funds and close the gaming account when the 
population registry shows the player is deceased.) Theoretically, a winning poker player 
could bring in revenue without any deposits but the first one, but these cases are 
marginal. As a Fraud Analyst the author would say an active player is someone who still 
plays, has made a second deposit and who has been identified. But there are as many 
definitions as there are people; This may depend on how the figures are used, is it for 
really describing the success of a marketing effort in order to learn and to evolve, or is it 
to fulfil some expectations of a balanced scorecard system affecting the possible 
bonuses of the employees, management and board members involved.  
4.6 A free lunch 
Just like with any other services, gaming operators, too, advertise special offers for new 
customers. Because the industry is highly competitive, the bonuses for an initial deposit 
at sign-up are sometimes very lucrative, one-per-customer offers.  
Company A used to have very good offers, for example a 10 euro bonus for a sign-up 
with no deposit requirements, with a minimal turnover requirement of just one time. This 
was a free lunch: Any new player could play with the 10 euro bonus money and make a 
withdrawal of his winnings. This resulted frequently in people signing up several times 
with varying false or stolen identities. The only obstacle was the one-gaming-account-
per-player policy, and the Fraud Team enforcing it. For if a player has an infinite number 
of 10 euro bonuses available, there are two basic approaches to getting a free lunch: 
The first one is playing to the player high-risk-games, such as slotmachines: If  he gets 
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a bigger win, he would try, withdraw the winnings into his bank account. Of course there 
is a possibility of never hitting anything close to a jackpot, given the finite time. The other 
approach is playing to the player low-risk games, such as table games: Placing the bets 
correctly on Roulette (black+red+0) or Baccarat (dealer+player) would always yield a 
return of more than 90%. One could sign up 100 times and have a total of almost 1000 
euros on 100 different accounts. However, withdrawals in this case could prove difficult: 
The gaming system would not allow for the use of the same bank account number more 
than once, and few people have dozens of bank accounts. (Some creative individuals 
discovered, though, that one could add an arbitrary number of zeros in the middle of a 
Finnish bank account number, and the gaming system would treat these as different 
bank accounts. Later, with the introduction of IBAN, this was no longer an issue.) But 
there was still another way for getting the funds out of the system: Poker – the external 
service providers. The players could transfer their winnings to poker and through chip-
dumping, gather all the funds into one gaming account, possibly at another operator, 
before a withdrawal request. 
4.7 Basic Screening 
Obviously some screening and monitoring was needed to understand the scale of the 
issue and to intercept possible fraudulent transactions. However, the gaming system had 
been built mostly with honest players in mind. The only tools available had been 
developed for the use of a Customer Service Team: A backoffice with basically a view 
to one individual player's information at a time only, and the widgets to manage the 
gaming account. Coming across promotion abuse this way by accident or even 
intentionally would first happen when it is massive or blatant: Player names or patterns 
that have become familiar to someone in the Customer Service, Support or Fraud Team 
due to the abundance of the similar details; Or just because of truly obviously bogus 
personal details: Random strings, celebrity or cartoon character names, phone numbers 
repeating the same digit(s). But any real-time information on the doings of multiple 
players' was only available through a PL/SQL command line interface to the gaming 
system database. While an SQL command line interface is extremely effective when one 
needs to find and combine any data in the underlying database, it is not very user-friendly 
for much else. Using it for screening purposes, especially, is not sustainable at all: No 
team can employ people full time running just one script every minute or two or five. And 
while command line interface output can be quite descriptive  – depending on the 
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selected queries -  it still needs far more than just a glance to analyse the results, 
because it lacks any visual clues. Usability needed to be addressed: We needed 
something automatized, not manual. We needed something highly visual that could be 
interpreted in a fraction of a second, something not to constantly observe but rather to 
attract attention when necessary. 
There were not enough resources to make a system recognize bogus identities or to 
learn similar patterns of players' signup information. It is not certain that such a system 
could ever be built either, for these are sometimes very difficult for even us humans to 
distinguish, largely a matter of language and cultural background as well. This meant the 
initial screening needed to be based on something else but the information filled in and 
submitted by the players upon sign-up. The very first prototype for screening was 
therefore made based on players' IP addresses used upon sign-up: Naturally, the 
gaming system database had always had information on each player's IP-address as 
well as sign-up time. This data was enough for a histogram that would show sign-ups 
per hour. On y-axis the time, the hours of the day going 24 hours back, on x-axis a bar 
showing the number of  sign-ups, new playing customers on each hour. The bars would 
come in two colours: To the left, the green part of each bar would represent the number 
of unique IP-addresses players used upon sign-up i.e. sign-ups more likely to adhere to 
the one-account policy. Topping the green part of each bar, the red part would show the 
number of sign-ups from non-unique IP-addresses, i.e. if more than one sign-up would 
come from one IP-address. Colours here are easily distinguished and the generally, 
culturally accepted ones: Green and red, good and bad, allowed and forbidden. (In larger 
teams with possibly changing personnel, blue could be used instead of green to cater 
for the most common type of colour blindness.) 24 hours back was selected, because 
one could then easily observe the normal situation and flow and distinguish any sudden 
or gradual deviation from it, be it the number of overall signups or the non-unique IP 
ones. Any member of the team could from the screen instantly tell, if there is a suspect 
promotion abuse going on (lots of red), whether the number of signups is in the increase 
or decrease (bars longer or shorter than the previous ones) – or if the system is down 
(no bars). What is more, no-one really needed to be staring at such graphs: One could 
simply not help noticing the possible presence of red colour, especially in large 
quantities. Even random visitors, passers-by would ask: Is there something going on with 
so much red on the screen? 
Because the necessary data was already available in the gaming system, no extra 
resources needed to be assigned: One table of its Oracle databases stored, among other 
35 
things, each player's sign-up time and sign-up IP and a for each player unique customer 
ID. A short PHP script (on an odd server somewhere at the corner of the server room) 
would create a database connection and fetch the data with a simple SQL query and 
draw a HTML formatted page, table with the histogram bars. The page would refresh 
itself every 60 seconds. The database required username and password were not stored 
in the script itself, but prompted for by the script as a username and a password which 
then were used to access the database. Upon a successful database connection i.e. 
when the credentials were approved by the database, the script would initiate a session 
storing these as session variables, thus eliminating the need to request them again or to 
store them anywhere else. This way, only persons having access to the underlying 
database could make use of the script and the information it provides. Such persons 
would also know the implications of initiating an SQL query, specifically the implications 
of running a heavy one too often by refreshing the view constantly or in a rapid 
succession. 
 
Figure 1. Sign-ups per hour. 
 
Figure 1 shows the very first prototype of screening. In general, most activity at any 
market appears in the late afternoon and evening local time, with a tiny peak during lunch 
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time. In this figure, everything looks like business as usual until 17 o'clock (17:00 – 
18:00): During that hour, the number of signups increased more than usual, which might 
signal a beginning of a promotion, but could still quite fall under the usual variation. After 
18 o'clock, however, the number of signups increased sharply and at this point it was 
obvious that a promotion had started. After 19 more and more red colour shows, 
indicating that not all the signups come from different, unique IP-addresses: Promotion 
abuse was ongoing: Probably a poorly designed campaign or campaign codes leaked to 
a web-forum – or both. Of the signups between 19 and 20 o'clock, 90 came from unique 
IP-addresses and 80 from non-unique IP-addresses. We can not from the graph tell, if 
these 80 non-unique ones all came from one IP-address or if they came from 40 different 
IP-addresses, or something in between; The database query is simple, fetching only the 
number of signups and the number of distinct IP addresses each hour. The length of the 
whole bar shows the number of total signups, the red part is simply the difference 
between the total signups and distinct IP addresses used upon those signups. But this 
information was enough to give us a relatively early warning to start monitoring and 
eventually discontinue the promotion.  
Screening based on IP addresses was a success: On several occasions unusual activity 
was detected this way and further action could be taken. Even though it is possible for 
the prospective player to change IP-addresses, it requires some effort, more work, an 
extra step further away from 1-click shopping. But even in the richest countries in the 
World, there are people to whom a 100-euro extra income every now and then would 
feel significant, worth some time and effort – not to talk about the poorest where this 
might present a monthly salary, something for the truly international operators to keep in 
mind. The World is evolving, and the fraudsters are, too, and the gaming operators need 
to follow.   
Once the first screening system was up and running, it was easy to add any lists, 
histograms, line graphs or pie charts: PHP has great features for creating images on the 
fly, and the programmer has a full control of the canvas, pixel-by-pixel. This makes it 
possible to squeeze a maximum amount of information into the screen space available 
and adjust everything for the visibility of anomalies. Some charts proved more useful 
than others. A pie chart with sign-ups by country would give a general idea about where 
things are happening on that specific day. A list of signups with a mismatch in 
geolocation, i.e. when the user selected country differs from the country their IP address 
indicates could reveal identity theft or identity misrepresentation. Rather than country 
names, the national flags proved to be a good colour coding, easily distinguished from 
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afar. Tiny line graphs for each currently active promotional campaign showing campaign 
codes usage as a percentage of the total available codes over time; A sudden change 
in activity could need some extra checking. Bar chart with recent credit card payments, 
the focus on payment status, the proportion of rejected or non-captured payments of the 
total: There is always a reason for a rejected credit card transaction, and one of the 
reasons could be a fraud attempt. If the chart would indicate any greater number of 
rejected payment attempts, Fraud Team could start monitoring the situation more 
closely. The chart, however, proved even more useful to the Payments Team: If a large 
number of payments stayed initiated, not updating into captured or rejected, this would 
indicate a situation when there is a technical issue somewhere. The chart helped to 
notice this before any bigger number of gaming customers would experience delays or 
failed payment attempts and start calling the Customer Service. Most of the time, 
Payments Team contacting the Payment Service Provider and notifying them about the 
issue helped. Not to talk about long term effects such as reputation, but an early warning 
and an early solution to a temporary issue like this directly effects the incoming deposits, 
even for a certain time afterwards: As described earlier, one of the credit card risk 
management parameters is recent payment attempts; if the accepted level is exceeded, 
any new payment attempts would be rejected within the specified time interval. Risk 
management rasters can not cater to every possible situation: In this kind of a case, even 
if the reason for rejection was a system error, the number of attempts would count 
irrespective of the result, and payments from that card would be rejected – leaving the 
playing customer without an opportunity to place bets and the operator without an 
opportunity for a profit. 
Recently there has been a lot of discussion about online shoppers' privacy, about how 
different trackers are trying to gather information on shopper behavior online in order to 
establish what kinds of products and services they are interested in and at what kind of 
prices these could be sold. Browsers are being equipped with add-ons such as 
adblockers and users growing more wary about the situation may switch between 
browsers or opt in using browsers' anonymous state to avoid tracking by cookies. At the 
same time, virtually all web pages have some Java or Flash content, and it is widely 
speculated, that trackers are capable of using these in order to identify each device using 
the features of these instead of cookies. And it is not merely speculation. 
 
Iovation 
Iovation has been using a technology similar to the one described above for years, 
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though not for marketing purposes. It offers a product to online merchants with a device-
based solution very popular among online gaming operators: Customers visiting the 
operator gaming website automatically run a script from Iovation, that gathers 
information on the customer's device. This information is then used to calculate a device 
fingerprint hash, ”black box”, unique to each device that can be linked to one or more 
customer accounts at the operator or other operators.  
The iovation black box can be used to share information between operators about 
devices with suspicious activities of different kinds: An operator detecting fraud can at 
Iovation tag the black box with a relevant code, anything from Credit Card Chargeback, 
Identity Theft or Chip-Dumping to Promotion Abuse. This way, no confidential customer 
information is leaked: No complete lists of black boxes are shared but only those that 
are included in the relevant operator customers' devices are available to each operator. 
But the other operators' Fraud Teams get a warning if the same device is used at their 
gaming service and they can take the necessary measures.  
The black box can be useful by itself, too: As in the above case of screening sign-ups 
per IP-address per hour, sign-ups per Iovation black box would produce a more exact 
result. This has at some Operators been used even to automatize one-account policy 
enforcement by locking accounts, when the number of sign-ups from one device exceeds 
a certain figure. Nowadays this is well justified as most devices are personal, never 
shared with anyone at least not for money gaming purposes. Five, not to talk ten years 
ago, however, this was not equally self-evident, and  one operator's Marketing Team felt 
there would be a risk of  losing ”prospective active players” this way. Of course this 
choice – whether or not to automatically block accounts - would affect the resources and 
the type of work needed at the Fraud Teams: Not having it automatized means more 
screening. Having it automatized, with possible false positives, results in more 
prospective playing customers getting a less than perfect initial user experience at the 
operator, in best case contacting the Customer Service and getting their case reviewed 
by the Fraud Team. And in worst case, moving on to another operator. 
Now if a lack of variety in IP-addresses or black boxes can reveal a fraudster signing up, 
creating multiple accounts, so could the abundance of either of them: If every sign-in to 
an account happens from a different IP-address or shows a different device black box, 
that most certainly raises suspicions, too: There might always be an overly eager Fraud 
Team member wanting to go through accounts where the number of distinct black boxes 
is equal or close to equal with the number of sign-ins: It is not very common for people 
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to switch between devices every time they sign in and play. A successful fraudster would 
need very good record-keeping, seeing to that these are consistent at all times: One 
gaming account should make use of the same IP-address or few IP-addresses and black 
boxes. The fraudster should never forget to switch between these when switching 
accounts, no mistakes allowed: Using the wrong IP or wrong blackbox in association 
with another account would quickly reveal it all. If you want to be a good liar, you need 
to have a very good memory. 
The best efforts of fraudsters of this kind so far are making are some automatized 
systems signing up, consistently changing IP-addresses and blackboxes. At the same 
time, everything a player or the system he created enters, can and will be searched: If 
1000 players give the same answer to the secret question, their password hashes are 
identical and the length and pattern of the email address is the same, they have been 
lazy, and they will be caught. At best, it is more like a sports for any Fraud Team to reveal 
these, a very good exercise to learn the creative ways of people and the features of the 
gaming system and at the same time a chance to prepare to fight possible more serious 
fraud. At its worst, it is a very inefficient way of fighting petty fraud with little economic 
impact. 
4.8  Monitoring 
When screening reveals something out of the ordinary, interesting from the Fraud Team 
point of view, they start monitoring the players indicated to judge whether the activity 
might be fraudulent. In this case ”players” often translates to ”gaming accounts”, for the 
odds are we are not talking about individuals behind the gaming accounts, but often an 
individual with several accounts. At company A, just as with the case of screening, the 
available tools were not really fitted for monitoring purposes, either: The players, and the 
Customer Service Team assisting them when necessary, need to have access to their 
sign-up information as well as gameplay and other monetary transaction history, 
gameplay by gameplay, transaction by transaction: This is in order to ensure 
transparency and fairness, that the players get a result and a possible win of every single 
gameplay they pay for, and that every penny is being accounted for.  
The players can see their own details when logged in to the gaming site of the operator, 
Customer Service Team can see one individual customer's details at a time in the gaming 
system backoffice. The needs of a Fraud Team are quite different: First of all, Fraud 
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analyst probably wants to see, compare several gaming accounts at the same time, the 
focus on the customer-entered details and other information acquired when the account 
has been signed-up or signed into. These accounts might be, for example, those that 
have several other accounts signed-up for from the same IP-address or device, that initial 
screening has revealed: The red part on the bar graph of our initial screening prototype 
described above. Selecting such accounts (clicking the red part of the bar working as a 
link) would show the customer ID, account balance, sign-up time, Name, street address, 
customer entered country, IP geolocation country, phone number, date of birth, email 
address, answer to the secret question, aliases used with external gaming service 
providers, some of the (otherwise too long) password hash, and the number of IP or 
blackbox associated accounts – all of these as columns, one account per row. From the 
information formatted this way, it was relatively easy for a Fraud analyst to notice, 
whether such accounts have been created by several distinct individuals or by one 
person only: The length of different strings in these fields alone can be revealing, if the 
email addresses are all of same format, for example. In general, a lack of creativity is a 
most revealing thing, something that can not be assessed by machines, but needs a 
Fraud analyst, preferably a person with the right cultural background, some knowledge 
of the language and perhaps even experience. In this example, in the column showing 
number of IP or black box associated accounts of each player, that number was a link 
opening a view with those accounts, leading possibly to even further revelations, fully 
punishing the fraudster for any laziness or mistakes. Another difference between the 
Customer Service needs and Fraud Team needs is related to the way the transactions 
are shown: Instead of a long, timestamp ordered listing showing possibly thousands of 
gameplays and some payment transactions, the Fraud Team initially needs to see just a 
summary: Payments (euro sums) in and out per payment method, bets and wins (euro 
sums) per game category, last 30 or a selected number of days.  
The above are just examples of simple systems and variables that were and can be used 
for screening and monitoring, some of the tools that the author made to help with the 
everyday workflow, hopefully prototypes for future in-house developments. Similar (close 
to) real-time graphs or information displays are available in many well-known, 
commercial products, such as Splunk (Splunk) or Oracle RUEI (Oracle).  
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4.9 Stop the money 
The tools developed by the author helped us greatly in screening and monitoring, even 
though the tools were all about just showing the existing gaming system database 
information in a different, more usable format. They helped us to reveal in total a huge 
number, an enormous amount of accounts with something suspect. My tools made use 
of barely reading data from the database, because we had read-only access, which is 
self-evident: The number of people with command line database write-access must be 
restricted to a bare minimum, and any systems with write-access must be thoroughly 
tested and approved which certainly was and could not be the case with screening and 
monitoring tools constantly adjusted to cater for the daily needs by a self-learnt 
PHP/PL/SQL experimenter. But, just reading data from the database can not stop the 
fraudsters – unless one reads so much and so heavily that the whole system goes down, 
which is not exactly an optimal solution. 
The HTML-based backoffice used by the Customer Service and Fraud Teams, however, 
had the necessary functions to activate, block or to close gaming accounts of individual 
customers: Log into the Backoffice; Search customers by name, email address, 
customer ID, phone number, personal number etc.; Select the account(s) and the 
desired account status change from the list; And submit the HTML-form; Done. The 
problem was, that the suspect accounts could run in dozens or hundreds. And one 
fraudster's numerous accounts did not necessarily have anything by the backoffice 
searchable items in common in order to have them appear on one and the same 
backoffice HTML-page, with just one form to check and submit in order to block the 
accounts and stop the thief. Thus, it was definitely not feasible to block all the suspect 
accounts one-by-one using this system. 
The existing HTML-based backoffice was quite simple, however, and it was relatively 
easy to recreate similar pages and views with exactly the same form and field names. 
The author noticed, that once he logged into the backoffice, the system did not check 
the origins of the data, and the author could submit a form from a page created by myself. 
This way, using a PHP-script from the screening and monitoring tools to fetch the data 
from the database, the author could have it create an HTML-page and populate a form 
in it that would look like backoffice search results with that data and inject the data, 
submit it to the system for account status changes, dozens of accounts at once. The 
system should naturally check, that the form submitted data would be in a right format 
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and go to the right place. This kind of reverse engineering gave an opportunity to use 
the existing backoffice as an interface to write or to modify certain columns or rows – the 
ones containing the related data included in the form of the bogus backoffice page - in 
the database in a safe manner. This way, we had a tool to change the account status: 
Block, close or activate any number of selected, suspect gaming accounts with ease. 
Unfortunately gaming account status change proved not to be the best way to deal with 
suspect accounts. First of all,  if a Fraud Team blocks a fraudulent customer account 
right away upon detection, prevents a sign-in, it signals the fraudster that he's been 
spotted. It thus offers a fraudster an opportunity to instantly make new iterations, find 
new ways of avoiding detection, learning faster. This kind of petty fraud fighting surely is 
interesting, like playing a giant computer game with the opponents evolving all the time, 
or cat and mouse, but so very inefficient. Secondly, very thorough screening and 
monitoring will reveal possible fraud, but it will create false positives, too: Perfectly good, 
honest customers might occasionally take the hit. And the worst thing for company 
reputation and the Customer Service workers is an honest playing customer who might 
feel unsure what is going to happen and whether they will get their money or not. 
4.10 Towards a better user experience 
Thinking of usability and customer experience, it would be much better to let the people 
sign in freely, play – never to let the gaming site reveal that there is anything special 
going on behind the scenes. The only thing that needs to be controlled is withdrawals 
and money transfers, because only there can money be lost. Playing is not a problem, 
because in long run, the house always wins and the fraudsters accounts will become 
drained by themselves, leaving them no need to contest the Customer Service or Fraud 
Teams for any money. So, instead of account status change, suspect accounts should 
be tagged and money transfers suspended until the necessary verifications have been 
made. A carefully adjusted selection of business rules could be applied to all playing 
customers to make screening and monitoring less important: For example, an 
unidentified player should never be able to withdraw in total more than he has deposited 
in total, an unidentified player should only be allowed to transfer to an external gaming 
service provider i.e. poker an amount he has deposited using a safe payment method 
plus the amount he has previously transferred from the same ESP, to name some ideas. 
Transfers, withdrawals of players with certain payment methods and gaming behavior 
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should be automatically put on hold until a thorough identification and any necessary 
background checks have been done. How tight the business rules are affects the need 
of resources available at Customer Service for explanations and Fraud Teams for 
identification and investigation. Of course delays in withdrawals are not desirable, but 
they are way easier to explain away as technicalities than blocked accounts.  
Communication is very important, too: The Marketing Teams, Customer Service Teams 
and Fraud Teams should always be aware of any new promotional campaigns well in 
advance, discuss the implications and constantly keep each other informed about the 
impact they have on them. And communication must include customers, too: The rules 
should be simple and transparent, encouraging early, voluntary identification in order not 
to delay withdrawals processing or other transfers of funds. This way, Customer Service 
teams will have more time to help the players with happier things, giving a better 
consumer experience. 
And as for the free lunches, they have been discontinued virtually everywhere. Perhaps 
the continuous fraud attempts had some effect on this. There are greater considerations, 
however: First of all, an initial deposit should always be required when granting a bonus 
to make sure the player has suitable payment instruments (and balance) available for 
playing. Secondly, with huge turnover requirements, huge bonuses can be advertised: 
A majority of players would rather take a 1000 euro bonus than a 20 euro bonus on top 
of their 20 euro deposit: The turnover requirement is written in a smaller print, and the 
operators rather fancy customers who do not calculate probabilities, anyway. The 
scariest part of the huge bonuses with huge turnover requirements is, however, that the 
biggest ones available are for slotmachines only. Slotmachines are the crack-cocaine of 
money gaming; And a certain percentage of population is always very prone to gaming 
addiction. One can't help suspecting that granting this kind of bonuses would be an 
intentional, a well-planned strategy for triggering gaming addiction and problem gaming.  
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5 CONCLUSION 
It has been over 10 years since the author first started working in the online money 
gaming industry. Looking back, one feels a sort of nostalgic about it. Many things have 
changed: Some truly internationally oriented gaming companies have already changed 
their focus and offer their services to fewer, even regulated markets with larger volumes 
in exchange for simpler processes and tools: developing world or economies in transition 
have brought in few players, the risks in these are high, identification integration is 
impossible and the culture is often unknown. At the same time, tiny new gaming 
companies are popping up to fill in the void, but often with limited, safe gaming product 
categories and payment options; it is possible nowadays to buy such fully working 
gaming systems with a few hundred thousand euros. In these, the work of fraud teams 
has been reduced to almost just checking identities and withdrawals. 
Nevertheless, one might wonder whether it was then, perhaps, very inefficient, false 
usability to make tools for early fraud detection, monitor the players' undertakings, getting 
to know them and their sign-up patterns and gaming behavior -Yes and no:  Of course, 
everything that can, should be automatised, for sooner or later one needs to ask: If you 
can not afford a technical, automatised implementation, can you afford not to make one?  
Still, someone should always have an idea of what is going on, what the players are up 
to. When that someone knows what's going on, it is easier to strive for those automatized 
technical solutions. The author was working in companies with in-house software 
development. An open-minded atmosphere and a positive attitude towards fraud 
analysts designing and prototyping their own tools helped to produce lots of fresh ideas 
and new tools. Later on, some of these tools would go through the company official 
release process and become part of the standard.  
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